What we know about the Internet and political protest (I)

The quote above is extracted from an article written in 1985 by George P. Schultz, US Secretary of State at the time. Even if I hadn’t just told you that the quote dates back to the 1980s, you would probably have been able to guess it for a couple of reasons. Firstly (you’ll have to trust me on this one), the “technologies” that Schultz makes reference to include tape cassettes and photocopying machines. Secondly, and most importantly, the quote represents an uninhibited optimism that characterised the early stages of today’s technological era. You will notice that there is not a shimmer of doubt in Schultz’s words: he is certain that new technologies will cripple totalitarian dictators. The power of technology is greater than the power of any government.

Of course, a quote like the one that opens this article sounds naive nowadays: we have grown increasingly cynical. But my goal here is not to mock Schultz’s overly optimistic views, but to use them to explain how human minds work. A technological development – the Internet, in this case – enters the stage, and many of us smile as we imagine all the fantastic effects that it will have on society. Shortly after that, the pessimists join the game. And they are not just any pessimists; they are radical, dogmatic prophets of doom who just know that the web will make the lives of dictators easier. As we shall see, the academic world was not free of such divisions, and until recently most analysts fell within one of those two camps.

The Initial Divide

During the first years of the Internet’s expansion, it seemed logical to be optimistic. Most of the original observers of this tool can be classed as ‘cyber-utopians’, who believed that the worldwide web would alter the balance of power between dictators and their populations in favour of the latter. The Internet appeared to be a space of freedom where, according to the ‘Streisand Effect’, censorship would be counterproductive. Furthermore, as the web grew in importance, countries’ economies became dependent on it. Thus, shutting down the Internet would just not be feasible for those regimes trying to control their populations – this is what we know as the ‘Dictator’s Digital Dilemma’. Finally, the communication costs of dissident movements throughout the world would be cut: whereas before they had to rely on leaflets, telephones or face-to-face communication, they could now spread information cheaply, immediately and to hundreds of people with just a click. Does it not seem obvious that a tool as revolutionary as the Internet would allow people to fight for their freedom more effectively?

Reporters Sans Frontières

However, time went by and dictatorships remained in place despite the advance of the Internet. And this led many to claim that, if all these dictatorships were still standing, it was partly thanks to the advance of the Internet. This set of analysts – which we will call ‘digital pessimists’ – made some good arguments. After all, most Persian Gulf countries have some of the highest rates of Internet usage on the planet, all while avoiding large-scale political unrest. China, the world’s largest dictatorship, seemed to be using the web to its advantage, employing it for surveillance purposes. And when unrest did break out, like it did in Iran in 2009, totalitarian rulers could simply cut off the country’s Internet connection and sit back as the opposition faded into irrelevance.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsZ6MLVmZBE

According to digital pessimists, there were three main reasons why greater Internet penetration had not led to the overthrow of more totalitarian regimes. Firstly, most computer users tended to enjoy mind-numbing entertainment – I’m looking at you Buzzfeed! – and thus forget about their real-life problems. Secondly, the few who decided to use the Internet for political purposes could use it to connect with hundreds of sympathisers… but this would only create weak links between distant acquaintances. By contrast, successful opposition groups have traditionally depended on strong inter-personal ties between friends and neighbours who knew each other, trusted each other, and were willing to sacrifice for each other. Finally, pessimists insist that we should pay attention to dictatorships themselves, since they too can use the web to their advantage. This is what Evgeny Morozov has termed the ‘Digital Dictatorship’, and involves a totalitarian state – China being the greatest example – using the Internet to suppress political unrest, keep an eye on potential dissidents, and, if discontent ever becomes too strong, switch off connectivity altogether.

All of this, of course, is a rather crude summary of the two points of view. But it serves to illustrate how the academic world has, from the beginning of the Internet Age, been divided between pessimists and optimists. However, these theories no longer seem good enough. They are of little predictive value, and they do not give a good enough explanation of the mechanisms of political protest. In other words, how exactly can the Internet be used – by both protesters and regimes – during uprisings? How can Internet use change the way political protests are carried out? Will the Internet be used in the same way by protesters worldwide, or will it have to be adapted to local specificities? These are the questions that really matter, and they are also the ones that analysts have begun to study in recent times. That will be the focus of my next article, and – yes, you guessed it – the Arab Spring will be mentioned. A lot.