The UK Conservative government has a strategy for tackling the current “refugee crisis” that is theoretically convincing but practically contradictory. The strategy consists of letting as few refugees onto UK soil as it can get away with, whilst increasing efforts to tackle the source of the crisis. The former is implicit in the numbers: until very recently, as part of its Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme the UK had welcomed just 216 of the 4 million-plus Syrian refugees fleeing violence since the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011. Compare this with Sweden, which has taken more than 50,000 Syrian refugees so far; Lebanon, which houses 1.2 million – a fifth of its entire population; and Germany, home to almost 100,000 Syrian refugees since 2011.
Since images of Aylan Kurdi – the Syrian toddler washed up onto Greek shores in early September – were dispersed throughout the media, Cameron has come under increasing pressure to revisit his stance. In response, he has pledged to take 20,000 refugees over five years – a politically convenient compromise. Compare this with Sweden, which expects 74,000 asylum seekers this year, and Germany, where the anticipated figure is 800,000 for 2015.
To justify such a minimal contribution to hosting the influx of refugees into Europe, Cameron has provided a coherent theoretical explanation: allocate resources to tackling the problem at its root instead of alleviating its consequences. This is a preventative strategy, as opposed to a palliative one. Acting on this strategy, the UK is increasing its aid provision to the region around Syria and urging its European neighbours to do the same. Cameron is also advocating for airstrikes in Syria to exterminate Assad and ISIS, and insisting that the UK take refugees only from Middle Eastern refugee camps, not from Europe. At face value this might sound reasonable; in context however, it is problematic and counterproductive.
First, Cameron’s callous approach to the crisis is based on clouded analysis. He argues that by creating a softer landing for refugees coming to Europe, we are encouraging migrants when we should be deterring them. This is to look only at the pull factors facing migrants – a rosier lifestyle in Europe than in Africa and the Middle East – and to ignore the glaring push factors – violent war and social destruction in their homelands.
Second, that the root causes of the problem need to be addressed is obvious enough. But to address the root causes of the crisis is to assume that the problem can be clearly identified and fixed. One need only glance at recent attempts to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to understand the naivety of such assumptions. Even if the root causes of the conflict can be identified and ways to resolve it found, this all takes a very long time. It will also be very expensive, requiring strong collaboration and commitment between capable states. Considering the EU’s current political and economic headaches, the prospects of achieving this any time soon are gloomy.
Also obvious is the huge wave of migrants arriving into Europe – at an average rate of 6,000 per day – overwhelming young central and eastern European states. But unlike the complexity of the conflict in Syria, this is an immediate problem with an immediate and perceptible solution. By sharing the burden of refugees, pressure on weaker states is eased and tensions reduced, not to mention lives saved. Yet the UK has exercised its right to opt out of a refugee-sharing EU quota – the only EU country to do so despite Ireland and Denmark possessing the same right.
By opting out, the UK is increasing the burden on the rest of Europe. To simultaneously press its neighbours to allocate more resources toward tackling the root causes of the crisis is akin to asking for a larger house to be built with fewer bricks. It is cheeky and counterproductive. The rest of the EU cannot be expected to match the UK’s increase in foreign aid at the same time as picking up the pieces left by the UK in Europe. If the UK were to oblige its neighbours in bearing its share of the migrant load, resources in other European countries would be freed up and they would be in a better position to contribute towards the long-term plan, advocated by the UK, of addressing the source of the “refugee crisis.”
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