Barack Obama has recently approved guidelines allowing the Pentagon—the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense—to continue fighting the Taliban, al-Qaeda and its allied forces in Afghanistan alongside the Afghan forces, provoking the debate whether the vibrant U.S. military presence in Afghanistan can adapt itself to a role merely aiding and advising in the near future, whether there is a political will for such passivity and if yes, whether or not such a move be politically feasible.
The speculations are many and not without good reason. The new guidelines issued by President Obama have come at a time when the world was waiting to see the US Army withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, slowly but surely, thereby ending its engagement in more than a decade long combat mission towards the end of 2014 and adapting a narrower policy of counterterrorism in the coming years before a total withdrawal could be finalized. It had become common knowledge that America would reduce its troops to 9,800 by the end of this year, which would be again cut in half in 2015, before a total withdrawal to coincide with the end of Obama’s presidency in 2017.
The end of the combat mission in a post-2014 Afghanistan was supposed to result in the U.S. military having provided a negligible security presence in the region and alongside, have trained the Afghan military against the Taliban. Thus, for the next two coming years, Obama administration had previously designed the nature of its military engagement in Afghanistan which has now been complicated by recent developments. The new guidelines have raised significant questions about the extent of US military engagement in Afghanistan.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the then-President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, initiated a combat mission against terrorism in Afghanistan. The mission was in response to the refusal of the Taliban government in Kabul to hand over Osama bin Laden and other terrorists complicit in the 9/11 attacks.
The fierceness of the U.S. mission drove out the Taliban within a span of a month since the beginning of the combat mission in October, 2001. However, it was proved that a combat mission wasn’t enough to tackle the threat of terrorism as the Afghan government was weak and incapable of having wider control throughout different parts of the country, which contributed to Taliban coming back with a better and a more effective guerrilla insurgency from 2005 with generous support from other insurgent outfits like that of the Haqqani network.
Throughout the years following 2005, there was a reasonable amount of justification for the war on terrorism the U.S. was fighting in Afghanistan, as repeated offensives were being launched by the Taliban disrupting the peaceful lives of the soldiers of NATO along with Afghan political leaders, its government and officials. When Obama assumed office in 2009, popular opinion in America went in favour of the U.S. war on terrorism.However, a strong antipathy towards the U.S. war efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq has developed in recent times. Most Americans find the war in Afghanistan unjustified as it has caused abundant disruption and loss of civilian lives along with the loss. The U.S. Senate wants the withdrawal to be finalized in the immediate future, suggesting the unpopularity U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan has increased among Congress members over the years. Stating the vital reason behind the withdrawals, President Obama said, “We achieved our central goal, or have come very close…which is to de-capacitate al-Qaeda, to dismantle them, to make sure that they can’t attack us again.” Throughout his second presidential campaign, Obama has repeatedly emphasized the fact that he was keen on ending the Afghanistan affair sooner rather than later. However, a sudden withdrawal was never an option as the U.S. had learnt the hard way since its historical blunder of 1989 that abandonment would render Afghanistan even more vulnerable to Taliban and other extremist forces.
The recent guidelines hint at the maturity U.S. military policy has gained from its past mistakes. The drawdown which was previously planned would still be consistent; the U.S. army would gradually prepare its withdrawal but until then it has been granted greater authority to issue orders in times of crisis. The U.S. combat mission will end next month in Afghanistan but the U.S. Army has every right to defend themselves proactively against the Taliban, if attacked. The right of self-defense is a new addition and was always part of the plan. However, the recent guidelines have extended greater autonomy in terms of its own security to the U.S. military. If the U.S Army finds the Taliban or the Haqqani preparing an offensive against the U.S. and its coalition forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. troops have been granted the liberty to disrupt such design. Yet there is a limitation to the guidelines which goes to show that the U.S. is after all hoping to end the war in Afghanistan it had started more than a decade back: the U.S. troops haven’t been allowed to conduct offensives against any Taliban forces they manage to locate. To carry out offensive operations, the US military needs to make sure that the insurgents’ threat to the U.S. and the Afghan National Security Forces is real and formidable and they have been found to directly support the al-Qaeda. On careful evaluation, when the threat is deemed too frightening to be overlooked, the U.S. can launch airstrikes, deploy jets and bombs and use with greater discretion their present capabilities.The new guidance seems to ensure that these will continue to be used in Afghanistan by the U.S. Military in the year 2015 and beyond. However, the decision to expand the U.S. troops’ authority does not mean Obama is redesigning his plan to end the combat mission which is being widely envisaged in American politics. The main purpose of the U.S. military presence post-2014 remains the same: fighting the al-Qaeda and those terrorist networks that sustain them on the one hand, and preparing the Afghan forces to emerge as a more credible power in the face of crisis fueled by insurgencies. The latter is an important task the U.S. has taken upon itself beyond the immediate future and is scheduled to continue for another decade until 2024.
Obama’s recent guidelines have been welcomed by Afghanistan’s new President Ashraf Ghani.
Afghanistan was beginning to realize that its military forces wouldn’t be able to perform effectively if there was no external support from the U.S. Their worst fears have been confirmed especially after the heavy losses Afghanistan has had to suffer in the hands of Taliban this summer. Afghan police and its army have confessed that they are in want of sufficient resources to fight the Taliban on their own. It is precisely for this reason that the active presence of U.S military is needed by Afghanistan. There is little guarantee that the U.S. military can prepare Afghan forces well enough within 2017 to fight undesirable terrorist advances from the Taliban. So, even after the U.S withdraws its troops in 2017, it still wishes to be engaged in a non-combatant role having its embassy presence in Afghanistan, at least till 2024.
The counterterrorism plan that the U.S. sees itself engaging with will be short lived as the U.S wants to make a gradual but steady transition to a role less combatant and more diplomatic in the future. This move has been embraced by President Ashraf Ghani through this signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) under which a provision has been made to allow 10,000 U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan after the combat mission ends on December 31, 2014. The BSA goes into effect on and from January 1, 2015 and remains in force at least until 2024 unless terminated prematurely. Under BSA, the U.S. forces will seek to “enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter internal and external threats against its sovereignty” by “advising, training, equipping and sustaining” Afghanistan’s military. It has been unambiguously stated that the counterterrorism operations carried out by the U.S. must complement and support the Afghan forces in their operations. Ghani has been more welcoming of the U.S military engagement in this regard than Afghanistan’s former President Hamid Karzai had ever been. Ghani realises the inherent weaknesses Afghanistan is mired in. He sees it unproblematic to reach out to the most powerful state in the unipolar world of today, even though his seeking assistance from the U.S could mean that America gets a greater power in the Middle East. The lure of power is one of the reasons why U.S.A has been delaying its withdrawal from Afghanistan for four years now. Through BSA it has managed to effectively secure its dominance without giving more than what has already been given by America to Afghanistan.
Obama’s new guidelines have provoked questions as to whether an end to the U.S. combat mission is really in sight, but the end to the combat mission is not a question the world community needs to bother itself with. The combat mission will end as prolonging the costly enterprise will cause more harm than good. Hence, the nature of the U.S presence in the post combat era needs to be debated.
Until 2017, when all troops are planned to be withdrawn, the rate of drawdown will ensure the nature of the military presence that Obama administration has decided on. However, it is highly unlikely that the U.S will restart its combat mission. The least it can do is continue its war on terrorism, albeit covertly, so as to not provoke the already growing disenchantment among Americans regarding the war in Afghanistan. On the surface, Obama could try to devise a mechanism through which his promise of ending the war is kept and justification behind his winning the Nobel Peace Prize, once upon a time, can adequately be provided.
U.S.A does not seem willing to leave Afghanistan to its own devices in the near future, and since Afghanistan itself can’t afford such abandonment, U.S.A can continue its military activities without remorse. Afghanistan’s weakness can help America craft a responsible image for itself, if it uses BSA to its advantage. Obama has taken one step forward towards this direction. With his continuous public advocacy for ending the war in Afghanistan, which even though has not turned into a political reality yet, he has developed the image of himself as a President who is willing to embrace peace but not at the cost of increased vulnerability of Afghanistan – hence the issuing of the new guidelines. The affront of 9/11 on America’s hegemony has caused two major wars on terrorism in the 21st century. To not see them through would severely diminish the pride of the unipole.
However, now that America is more than half a way there, it is predictable on its part to take a step back and let the Afghan army play a more proactive role. The U.S.A would maintain its consistent presence which would serve also as warning to the Taliban that Afghanistan has not been rendered powerless in one sudden stroke when U.S. troops return home. As of now, the U.S. is definitely not finished with Afghanistan. The recent guidelines bear strong testimony to this fact.
