For the last few weeks, Asian relations seem to have been put on hold. Tensions over territory and resources which dominated attention over the summer receded into the background as attention turned first to the United States, where Barack Obama was able to fend off his Republican challenger to secure a second term, and then to China, where the 18th Party Congress reached its “victorious conclusion”, with the ascension of Xi Jinping. Despite these well-publicised showcases, perhaps the most significant leadership transition in the region is yet to come.
Three weeks ago, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced his decision to dissolve Parliament and call for a snap election. This is expected to be held on December 16th. Noda’s time in office has been beset by economic and political difficulties, made worse by the recent pressure from China over the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands. These flared spectacularly during September of this year, even attracting sensationalist front-page headlines in The Economist. Whilst Noda necessarily took a strong public stance over the issue, his appointment of former Foreign Minister Tanaka Makika as Education Secretary was widely seen as an attempt to cool tensions in the East China Sea.
The December elections are significant for East Asian relations because of the nature of the challenge to Mr Noda’s leadership. In September, the opposition Liberal Democratic Party decided that Abe Shinzo would return to become leader of the party, having resigned from the office of Prime Minister in 2007. Abe is known primarily as an outspoken nationalist. He has previously pushed for a more assertive Japanese posture with regard to China, raising the possibility of stationing Coast Guard personnel on the Senkakus, and promoting greater emphasis on patriotism in school textbooks—opposing the present “masochistic” view of history.
His most controversial stances include his questioning of evidence that women were forced to become sex slaves by the Japanese army during World War II—he recently called for a revision of the Kono and Murayama statements: the official apologies from Tokyo issued in 1993 in 1994—and his harsh criticism of Japan’s “Article Nine”—which prohibits the maintenance of military forces and renounces the right to belligerency. In October, Abe paid a high-profile visit to Yasukuni shrine: a controversial cemetery which sanctifies the spirits of Japanese war dead, including Class A war criminals. Unsurprisingly, none of these stances play well in China, where rampant anti-Japanese sentiment already poses a significant problem for the leadership.
All of this matters, because it seems as though Abe might win. Prime Minister Noda’s leadership is deeply unpopular, and despite a slight narrowing in the polls as the the election draws near, his party still trails the opposition. It is unclear whether Abe will be able to garner enough seats to form a government, but with reports suggesting a large section of the population to be undecided but troubled by economic instability, Abe’s appeal to populist nationalism may find some additional traction.
Even if the election results bring about a coalition government, Abe would almost certainly take the role of Prime Minister. This seems the most likely result, with the newly-formed Japan Restoration Party—a merger of several right-wing groups—tipped to play kingmaker. The election campaigns have thus far remained relatively inward-looking, and foreign policy will not be a decisive factor for many voters. Nevertheless, the new government will not be able to avoid the on-going dispute with China. Election season may have cooled tensions for now, but renewed challenges lie ahead.
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