Reconciliation in Mali is essential to disrupt the cycle of fragile peace and recurring violence. It will be an uphill struggle, but one that must be pursued.
The conflict in northern Mali is now entering its “final phase”, say French troops engaged in the country’s northern region. There is already talk of their withdrawal and potential replacement by an African peacekeeping force under a UN mandate.
This may not come for some months – but the fighting proper will likely soon be over. The Tuareg ‘Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad’, or MNLA, now support French forces; the Islamist militants have been largely routed. But this is not the end of the battle – not by a long stretch. Mali faces a difficult process of reconciliation. Achieving long-term peace requires engagement with Mali’s marginalised minority communities – the Tuareg in particular.
Regional Security
Why is reconciliation in Mali so important? Firstly, there are broad geopolitical concerns – a secure Mali is crucial for the entire Sahel, the region spreading the breadth of Africa below the Sahara. The Sahel contains parts of some of the continents most unstable states – characterized by porous borders, it is notoriously difficult to police.
At a recent UN Security Council meeting, representatives from Chad, Niger and Benin all voiced fears that Mali could become a ‘base camp’ of Islamic extremism throughout Africa. Algeria’s recent hostage crisis is testament to this. Talk of a ‘Black Jihad’ is overly sensationalist but if the conflict is left to fester, Mali will certainly become a destabilizing influence across the whole Sahel region and beyond.
Human Security
Reconciliation is also essential for human security. Displaced Tuareg and Arabs fear reprisal if they return to their homes – although the MNLA turned on their Islamist former partners, many in Mali harbor animosity toward Tuaregs for their role in the 2012 occupation of the northern regions.
Reports are already emerging of retaliation against perceived collaborators by the Army and ordinary Malians. The MNLA complain of torture, summary executions and forced disappearances. These revenge attacks must be stopped, swiftly and decisively. International peacekeeping forces have a critical role here, but long-term security will require more than the protection of arms. More subtle solutions are needed.
Long-term stability requires long-term solutions
Sustainable peace in Mali and the wider region will require systemic change. The Malian government and the international community must address the country’s fundamental problems of poverty, poor governance, inequality & marginalization.
The Tuareg, the Sahel’s Berber tribesmen, feel many of these problems acutely. Concentrated in the country’s north, the Tuareg make up roughly 10% of Mali’s population. Bowing to the authority of Mali’s centralized government – dominated by southern ethnic groups since the 1960’s – has never sat well. The Tuareg population complain of neglect, discrimination and underrepresentation. Unequal access to resources is also common a protest: poor governance and a degree of corruption have meant that little developmental aid and government spending has reached the northern regions
The Tuareg are not alone; Arabs and other northern communities also feel marginalised by the government in Bamako. The MNLA seek an independent state named ‘Azawad’ in the north, claiming to represent the interests of all Tuareg, as well as other ethnic groups. In truth, many do not identify with the MNLA: but these separatist ambitions do reflect a wider desire for autonomy and equality shared by many northern communities.
To their credit, the government did pursue policies of decentralisation during the 1990’s and late 2000’s. But progress was uneven and ultimately ineffective – stilted by the fear of being seen to appease rebel groups. This failure of implementation became a bone of contention in itself.
Recognition of grievance and the need for dialogue
Mali’s northern communities clearly have genuine grievances. Long-term solutions will require political consensus towards creating a system of governance for the diverse country.
An independent Tuareg state is neither feasible nor unanimously desirable, but more meaningful devolution of power would help matters – the NGO can play a role on encouraging decentralisation. Negotiating such sensitive settlements will require dialogue, which is a problem in itself.
The latest crisis has hardened rhetoric towards the Tuareg and Arab communities for many in the south, politicians and laypeople alike. Leaders once spoke of reconciliation – this has been replaced by hard-headedness and animosity. This is difficult to combat; the international communities role in facilitating this process is crucial. Pressure must be applied to political elites to promote dialogue between villages, communities and regions.
Politicians in the south fear appearing to reward rebellion – this is short sighted. The Malian Government must seek dialogue with those Tuareg separatists who eschew terrorism and violent means. After all, stability in the north is a mutual goal for both parties. The desire for retribution cannot be allowed to obscure genuine grievances of Mali’s northern communities. If ignored, the outlook for Mali and the whole Sahel region will be grim indeed.
This article was written by Tom Clarke and originally appeared on World Outline.
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