This is how the fairy-tail goes: “Suddenly Abdullah Ocelan, founder of the militant marxist PKK, decided to agree to negotiate with the AKP government. The party that once called for an independent Kurdish state, agreed to a peace/truce whereby the Kurds obtained “cultural rights” (mainly the right to officially use their language!)”
The official explanations and reports of the peace process and how it came about cannot be considered “realistic”. Especially in this violent conflict that extends, tangibly, to 1978.
One should look to in Northern Iraq (to Kurdistan) and to the Syrian revolution to understand the key factor behind the apparent success of this round of negotiations.Explained it in the following steps while hoping not to oversimplify this complicated historical event:
Turkey was heavily involved in the Syrian revolution since its beginning months. It has thrown away its “zeroing of problems” strategic choice in its international relations. Instead, Turkey chose, courageously, to severe its special partnership with the Syrian state. The partnership with Syria has provided Turkey with a cheap transit for its terrestrial exports towards the gulf and beyond, it was in itself an invaluable market for Turkish goods (the trade balance shifted towards Turkey’s favor).
After Turkey weighed in beside the rebels, the Syrian regime and its ally Iran, were expected to use the “Kurdish card”. Iran, owning its own military industry was suspected of handing out arms to Ocelan’s PKK. By doing so, the Iranian regime would gain heavy leverage in any future negotiations with NATO and its member Turkey. In all scenarios, Assad’s allies made Turkey understand that it could also pay a heavy price if it were to face a better armed and financed PKK in Turkey’s southeastern provinces.
However, Turkey ceased a suitable opportunity when political turmoil accentuated in Iraq. Kurdistan-Iraq chose to stand in opposition to Al-Maliki’s central government in Baghdad. The relationship between Baghdad and federal Kurdistan was always strained due to disputes pertaining to revenues from oil produced in Kurdistan: The Kurds signed numerous contracts with multinational oil companies independently from Baghdad, a step that the central government always viewed as unconstitutional.
Turkey provided a much needed support for Kurdistan in this conflict with AL-Maliki. Being a regional important power and sharing long borders with Kurdistan-Iraq, Turkey enabled the Kurds to commercialize their oil with a much greater degrees of autonomy from Baghdad’s central government: using Turkey’s mediterranean ports.
Part of the bargain seems to be that Kurdistan-Iraq obliges PKK to sign a peace treaty. It is widely known that PKK depends on its bases and logistical/political support that it received from Northern Iraq’s Kurds. Thus, the alliance linking Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds condemned PKK to complete military suppression if it continued its war with its back (northern Iraq) completely exposed to Turkeys war-machine.
This thesis is supported by recent developments on the ground. Turkey signed a strategic accord with Kurdistan-Iraq to build an oil pipeline linking Kurdish oil to Mediterranean export ports10. As expected, The Iraqi government was not included in either the talks nor the agreement itself!
Moreover, reassured by being relieved from the PKK threat, Turkey took an even bolder stance in the Syrian revolution: in Ankara, leaders of armed rebel battalions met publicly and talked openly about military strategy and about receiving arms. This is not to say that the peace accord between Turkey and the PKK isn’t a much valuable strategic and humanitarian achievement. Politically, Erdogan is believed to be paving the way for a much smoother presidency after the anticipated constitutional amendments.
About the Author
