It has been just over six months since Kim Jong-un took the helm of the world’s most volatile nuclear power. It’s time to take a look at how the world’s youngest head of state has fared on the job so far.
A Remarkably Smooth Power Transition
North Korea’s leadership transition has been remarkably smooth and successful, confounding the numerous predictions of potential instability due to Kim Jong-un’s inexperience. With no apparent threats from potential challengers or a popular uprising, Kim Jong-un has survived the initial transfer of power that followed his father’s death. The top North Korean Army generals have joined ranks around him, presenting a unified command and stressing that Kim is in sole control of the country, though some analysts speculate that North Korea is more likely being ruled by a collective leadership.
A smooth succession has been achieved with the help of a crackdown on potential opposition and a concerted public relations campaign. In preparation, numerous senior officials were removed from office, reportedly as a purge of those resistant to a second NK dynastic succession. Arrests and executions were also used to quell any potential resistance to the new regime. At the same time, Pyongyang’s propaganda machines glorified the new leader and extoled the legitimacy of his succession. The younger Kim was bestowed with numerous titles and his ties to his father and grandfather were accentuated. To bolster his credentials, he was credited with masterminding North Korea’s 2009 nuclear test, the test launch of the Taepo Dong II missile, and Pyongyang’s two attacks on South Korea in 2010.
The New Regime Strikes a Defiant Tone
A day after Kim Jong-un was declared “supreme leader” on 29 December last year following his father’s death, a statement from the National Defence Commission read: “We declare solemnly and confidently that the foolish politicians around the world, including the puppet group in South Korea, should not expect any change from us.” North Korea’s important New Year message continued the defiant tone of the new regime, vowing to “make no slightest vacillation and concession in implementing the instructions and policies [of Kim Jong-il]…[W]e will allow no change.” A few days later, Pyongyang directed a volley of criticism at Lee Myung Bak’s regime in South Korea, emphasizing that it would not soften its hardline stance against its old foe. “If a change is to be expected in the peninsula,” went the line, “it is only a total ruin of the Lee group which is as good as the living dead.”
A New Diplomatic Leaf? No, Same Old Tactics
Then, after a flurry of negotiations in Beijing, North Korea announced on February 29 that it would suspend nuclear weapons tests and allow inspectors into its nuclear facilities, in exchange for food aid from the US. Observers expressed hope that North Korea may be ready to turn a new diplomatic leaf with the US. But the deal collapsed just weeks later with North Korea’s surprise announcement of a missile test to put a satellite into space, viewed by Washington as a test run for launching a nuclear weapon. Some questioned the coherence of decision-making in the country, but for many it was clear that the new regime was returning to customary patterns of bluster and brinkmanship to recapture global headlines and increase its leverage in future negotiations.
The $1 billion test failed as the rocket splintered harmlessly into the Yellow Sea, but that did little to alleviate concerns. To recover from the embarrassment, the military unleashed a bellicose warning to South Korea in late April, threatening that a “special operations action” team would “reduce to ashes the rat-like” leadership of Lee Myung-bak. Kim then formalized North Korea as a “nuclear armed state” in the Constitution, another signal that the government has no intention of giving up its nuclear program. And at last week’s ASEAN summit, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-Chun insisted his country needs atomic weaponry to deter a US nuclear threat, and vowed never to give up its right to launch rockets as part of what it called a peaceful space program.
Angering China
Most surprising is how Kim has thumbed his nose at China, whose economic largesse keeps the government afloat. Right after he assumed power, China gave North Korea 500,000 tons of food and 250,000 tons of crude oil, which helped overcome the country’s worst drought in 60 years. Shortly after Kim took over, a Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs visited Pyongyang and sternly warned him not to proceed with a ballistic missile test. But he was brazenly ignored. Then in May, more than two-dozen Chinese fishermen were held captive for two weeks by North Korea in May. After their release, one of the fishermen described “13 days of hell” in which they were beaten, robbed, and starved. China’s soft response to the incident highlights the dilemma it faces in that applying too much pressure to North Korea could contribute to the collapse of its government, a potential nightmare scenario for the Chinese. It also highlights that Pyongyang is fully aware of China’s dilemma.
Kim Jong-un’s Leadership Style
An intriguing contrast to this bellicosity has been the development of the younger Kim’s leadership style. Since taking charge, Kim Jong-un has appeared much more approachable and outspoken than his taciturn father. He openly acknowledged the failed rocket launch in April, gave a live televised speech celebrating Kim Il-sung’s centenary birthday for over 20 minutes, and is often seen letting his underlings embrace him. His father notably made just one speech during his 17 years in power and that only a single sentence. For Kim Jong-il, admitting to an embarrassing fiasco, making television appearances, and getting close to people would have been unthinkable.
Of course, the North Korean media has praised this as a manifestation of Kim’s unparalleled kindness and humanity. His more benign and engaged public persona is an imitation more of his grandfather’s style, and may be trying to remind of “the good old days” of the Kim Il-sung era rather than the more stifling environment under his father. But while there certainly has been a change in style, much more important is whether this translates into substance. In his first six months, Kim Jong-un has above all affirmed and continued his father’s songun (military first) policy. Of Kim’s over 70 public visits so far, over 45% have been related to the military. Analysts have also found an increasing tendency to promote military figures to positions of power, rather than elevating economists, professionals, and technocrats with expertise needed to guide development and growth.
Whether Kim Jong-un will eventually be able to chart a truly new course for his country, one that involves reform at home and cooperation abroad, remains to be seen, and in any case would have to wait until he has fully established himself as the new ruler. The situation at present in North Korea remains ambiguous. Kim has survived the immediate process of leadership transition, but in the long run he will need to develop his own source of legitimacy. This would conceivably have to come either through foreign policy successes or by improving the country’s economic situation.
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