Whilst the world was captivated earlier this month by the drama of the US election, many miles away in China elites were jockeying amongst themselves behind closed doors to secure positions within the Politburo’s highest decision-making body, the Standing Committee. On the 15th November, the result was broadcast to the world as the seven new members walked in stage at the 18th National Party Conference: Xi Jingping, who takes over the leader role from Hu Jingtao, Li Keqiang, who will take Wen Jiabao’s place as prime minister, and Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang, Shanghai party boss Yu Zhengsheng, propaganda chief Liu Yunshan, Vice-Premier Wang Qishan and Tianjin party boss Zhang Gaoli.
The process has been designed to appear smooth, suggesting that in China’s non-democratic system of governance, the Party has successfully institutionalised the transfer of power over from one generation to the next. The editorial of the China Daily on the 15th November made this intention clear: ‘The ostensible lack of drama throughout the week-long session may disappoint sensation seekers’ i.e. Western critics. Indeed, many see in this contrast with the intense partisanship of the US election proof that China is on the rise while America tears itself apart. Nevertheless, despite more and more people confidently proclaiming that the relatively orderly transfer of power, allied to China’s consistently impressive economic growth rates, proves that Western liberal-democracy is a model soon to prove outdated, there remains much in this ‘handover’ that should concern both those within China and outside.
In reality, China’s undeniably rapid economic growth conceals a profoundly unequal society in which political and economic power is concentrated more than ever in the hands of the elite. We can see this in the scandal which engulfed Wen Jiabao in late October. The New York Times revealed that his relatives control assets of up to $2.7 billion, their improved economic fortunes being concomitant with Wen’s political rise. That the Chinese government blocked the New York Times’ website in China as a result only confirms how sensitive the issue of corruption is for the government. Indeed, the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, the last major political crisis for the Chinese Communisty Party, can be linked back to the issue of corruption, for example during the crisis the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Association issued a manifesto against official corruption, criticising ‘these bureaucrats [who] use the people’s hard earned money to build luxury’. In many ways, the situation is even worse now than before: the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has found that the gap between urban and rural incomes has jumped 68% since 1985. What we have, therefore, is a situation in which the Party elite are perceived correctly by the masses as having exploited their privileged political positions to pursue their economic interests at the expense of the rest of the nation. The result is a credibility gap which threatens the very future of the Party.
The new leadership is not unaware of this problem. Xi Jingping spoke in his first speech in his new position of ‘the problems among party members and cadres of corruption, taking bribes, being out of touch with the people, undue emphasis on formalities and bureaucracy must be addressed with great efforts”. Wang Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong province, further revealed how China’s leading politicians are feeling the heat of public anger: “I believe officials in China will gradually have public disclosure of their family’s assets according to the rules of the Central Committee.” Nonetheless, this public rhetoric, which raises expectations of reform, masks the reality that China’s new leadership represents continuity and not change: it is unlikely that these men will enact the necessary reforms to stymie public anger and create more balanced and sustainable economic growth.
I can make this argument for a number of reasons. Firstly, the composition of the new Standing Committee suggests a victory for conservative interests: Jiang Zemin, the former President, seems to have been able to prevent candidates linked with reform – Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang most notably– from joining the committee. While the Standing Committee has been reduced to 7 members from 9 in order to make collective decision-making easier, it will nevertheless prove difficult for Xi Jingping, assuming that even intends to do so, to prevail over these more conservative allies of the old leadership.
Moreover, while Xi has taken a public stance against corruption, he is himself, as are 3 of the other 6 members, a member of the princeling class. Their position as relatives of former revolutionary heroes has given them the necessary connections, in both the political and business world, to rise to high political office as well as opportunities to create their own patronage networks. We can see this in how the influential Ye family helped to prevent the economic reformer Wang Yang from reaching the standing committee. As one independent Chinese commentator said to the New York Times: “We don’t have elections, and we don’t have a system, so they go for the person with the most connections.” We cannot expect, therefore, these men to undertake political and economic reforms which threaten both their patrons and their clients.
Evidently, the short-term political interests of the new Standing Committee are likely to prevent the economic reforms the nation wants and needs. Thus, we should not romanticise the Chinese political system as less messy or as more capable of enacting change than Western forms of democracy, nor should we view China’s rise as exponential. Instead, if the new Standing Committee does not take action to clampdown on endemic Party corruption and continues to monopolise economic interests in state corporations, an already severe legitimacy crisis could escalate dramatically. Without the freedom to vote out unpopular politicians, the frustrations of the increasingly self-confident Chinese aspirational class could erupt in unpredictable ways. The Chinese elite may find its political strategy of avoiding reform now, represented by the new members of the Standing Committee, in fact jeopardises the long-term future of the Party and the wider national interest.
Image Credit: Associated Press
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