Iran and the Arab Uprisings

Ever since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has tried to cast itself as the head of the radical camp in the Middle East. Iran’s foreign policy did not lose its revolutionary zeal through the years. Iranian support for radical movements in the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as radical regimes like Assad in Syria remains the corner stone of Iranian foreign policy ever since the rise of the Ayatollahs. Iran attempted to overcome its isolation as a Persian and Shiite state surrounded by Arab predominantly Sunni neighbors by appealing to the aspiration of the Arab masses, through supporting radical anti-Zionist, anti-American movements in the region. However, the advent of the Arab Spring has changed the perception of Iran in the region. Iran is now seen by a large number of Arabs as an anti-revolutionary force in the region. The home of the Islamic Revolution has lost its appeal.

One of the main pillars of Iran’s foreign policy in the region was appealing to the Arab masses over the heads of their government, by presenting itself as an anti-imperialist, truly Islamic order. This appeal has been shattered by Iranian support of the Assad regime. This support has evaporated the credibility of Iran as a revolutionary state, due to its failure to distance itself from Assad, and support the uprising of the predominately Sunni Syrian country side. As the images of carnage from Syria flood Arab television screens, and news of Iranian military support coincide with it, the credibility of Iran evaporates. News of Hezbollah fighters and Iranian revolutionary guard involvement on the side of Assad’s forces has been particularly damaging to Iran. To the mind of many Arabs, Russian and Iranian support are vital for the survival of the Assad regime, a belief that is very damaging to Iran. This means that Iranian isolation in the region will increase as both the Arabs and their mostly conservative governments share strong anti-Iranian sentiments. Iran has played into the hands of the Arab conservative states.

Iran’s support of Assad has evaporated their credibility as a revolutionary state. Image: james_gordon_losangeles/Flickr

Iran has also made another blunder; it did not follow a consistent policy regarding different Arab uprisings. This policy has deepened the Sunni-Shiite fault line that has plagued Middle Eastern politics very visibly since the Iraq war. Iran provided moral support to the Bahraini uprising, an uprising of a predominately Shiite population against a Sunni ruling family supported by Saudi Arabia. The Iranian stance in relation to Bahrain compared with its position regarding the Syrian uprising has cemented the identity of Iran as a Shiite state rather than an anti-imperialist, revolutionary state that transcendences ethnicity and religious differences. The uprising in Syria is a predominantly Arab Sunni uprising against an Alawite dominated regime. Alawisme is considered by some to be a Shiite sect, although Assad senior needed a fatwa to confirm that when he took power. This has given the impression that Iran supports the Bahraini uprising because of it Shiite character, rather than supporting it out of principals of revolutionary solidarity and resistance to oppression. This has led to an increase in Iranian isolation and the deepening of the Sunni-Shiite fault lines.

The Iranian stance in relation to Bahrain compared with its position regarding the Syrian uprising has cemented the identity of Iran as a Shiite state rather than an anti-imperialist, revolutionary state that transcendences ethnicity and religious differences. Image: RyanBayona/Flickr

Iranian policy regarding the Arab uprisings has followed the principals of realpolitik. It has ignored decades of revolutionary rhetoric and has followed a realist conception of national interests. Iran supported a long-standing ally, the Assad regime, against a popular uprising. In doing so it distanced itself from its own revolutionary character. On the other hand, it provided support to the uprising in Bahrain, a small Island which was claimed by Iran at a certain point in time. This ironically has also distanced it from its attempts to appeal to the Sunni Arab masses. Iran appeared to support the uprising of a Shiite population in Bahrain, but oppose the uprising of a Sunni population in Syria. However, one should not be misled by Iranian support to the Bahraini uprising. Iranian support for the Bahraini uprising does not only stem from historical links and religious motives, it stems from the desire to increase Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, balance Saudi Arabia, and to appeal to the Shiite minority living in Saudi Arabia.

In short, the Arab Spring has deepened Iranian isolation in the region. The long standing Iranian policy of appealing to the populations of the regions over the heads of their governments has lost its credibility. The Sunni-Shiite split, as well as the Persian-Arab split has hardened rather than softened. Iran has failed to cease the moment of the Arab Spring, which was the best possible chance for Iran to break its isolation and dramatically alter the map of the Middle East.