‘One Nation’ – Two Narratives

Cairo has so far been spared the same fate as Damascus, but sure enough, the sounds of fireworks and jubilant crowds that greeted the coup of July 3^rd have now been replaced by the grimmer sounds of sirens and gunfire across Egypt’s major cities. Aside from daily violent episodes in the capital itself, the most serious leaving 51 dead and over 400 injured, lethal clashes have been reported in several Egyptian cities such as Mansoura, whilst militants continue to plague the lawless areas of the Sinai region. The death toll from political violence since June 30^th may well have entered triple figures, but as Robert Fisk writes, nobody really knows for sure.

Fears of civil war are resurgent, and the initial confidence in the coup, evident in the surge in the Egyptian stock market after Morsi’s deposition was announced, appears to have faded. Consensus within the National Salvation Front, the anti-Morsi political coalition, has begun to break down whilst, in parallel, the minority that backs the deposed President, drawn mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood, grows ever bolder.

The response of the acting government has been to stress the need for reconciliation and dialogue. Interim President Adly Mansour had extended a hand to the embittered Brotherhood, launching the ‘One Nation’ initiative, offering them a voice in his transitional government, whilst the Vice-President, Mohamed El-Baradei, tweeted this appeal for calm to his 1.8 million followers on July 23^rd:

Transitional justice and national reconciliation based on inclusiveness are only option. The sooner we realize this the more lives are saved

— Mohamed ElBaradei (@ElBaradei) July 23, 2013

However the Brotherhood staunchly continues to shun the prospect of a compromise with a government whose legitimacy they fiercely reject and consequently no Brotherhood figures feature in the transitional cabinet. Instead, spokesmen from the Brotherhood have seized every opportunity to condemn the interim administration.

In an ominous development on July 24^th, the head of the armed forces and Deputy Prime Minister, General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi bypassed civilian authorities to call for mass protests to renew the mandate the army feel they were given by the people on July 3^rd.

Ousted from the position of power they were never truly comfortable in, the Brothers are now back in familiar territory and have returned to the role they have long been accustomed to – the voice of dissent and opposition. With the exception of their year in power, the Brotherhood has been at odds with Egypt’s rulers since the movement’s foundation in 1928, when the first Brothers resisted British colonial rule. Hassan al-Banna, their founder, saw his fledgling organisation as a bastion of conservative Egyptian tradition against foreign imperialism and influence – an ideology that clashed with successive Egyptian regimes throughout the twentieth century.

In 1954 the Brotherhood was outlawed and thousands of its members were imprisoned by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser that had seized power in a coup two years earlier. Nevertheless, during its underground era the Brotherhood extended the depth and breadth of its influence in Egyptian society, winning support by providing medical services, education, and welfare provisions to communities wherever the state failed to. This role, as a social benefactor, added a powerful new dimension to the Brotherhood’s self-image. By the 2011 revolution the Brotherhood had emerged as the political force best placed to take advantage of the power vacuum following the collapse of Mubarak’s regime, but a movement still deeply instilled with a persecution complex.

Popular support for the coup is overwhelming but the minority that oppose it are united in ideology and share the same vision, portraying themselves as the defenders of democracy and the rule of law. In the eyes of the Brothers, the interim administration is an affront to justice, cast from the same mould as the tyrannical military regimes of the past, regimes that had driven them underground and martyred fellow Brothers.

So the history of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Muslim Brotherhood is the story of a pious, benevolent organisation victimised and oppressed by cruel opponents whom they defied to come to power in Egypt’s first free presidential elections, only to have the Egyptian army, the enemy of democracy, the pawn of the foreign powers that fund it, to illegitimately snatch power out of their hands, arrest their leadership, and butcher their supporters.

This compelling narrative, and the shared feeling of righteous indignation it ignites, has allowed the heavily outnumbered pro-Morsi contingent to unite and sustain their campaign for, as they see it, legitimacy of the presidency, the constitution, and democracy.

In contrast, the previously unstoppable momentum of the architects and supporters of the anti-Morsi movement seems to have slowed somewhat. Put aside for the duration of the June 30th ‘Tamarod’ campaign, the political differences between the parties that forged an alliance to topple Morsi and the Brotherhood are now rising to the surface and disrupting the process of transition. The al-Nour party, an Islamist element within the anti-Morsi campaign, vetoed liberal politician Mohamed El-Baradei’s appointment as Prime Minister. Leading figures of the Coptic Christian community, who make up around ten per cent of Egypt’s population, have also criticised the heavy-handedness of the military-backed interim administration.

The Muslim Brotherhood has once again been backed into a corner, yet history indicates this will merely strengthen their resolve. Egypt’s delicate revolution is far from over, and bloodshed is likely to continue unless steps are taken to defuse the tension and reverse polarisation. General Sisi’s provocative statement of July 24^th will only fan the flames whilst Morsi’s continued detention, without charge and incommunicado, remains a barrier to reconciliation. What is certain is that the longer the Brotherhood continues to isolate itself from the political process, and the longer it clings to its narrative of injustice, righteous anger, and persecution, the faster the hopes of a peaceful solution to the Egyptian crisis will fade.