The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was signed on October 21, 1994 between North Korea (DPRK) and the US. Similarly to the recent nuclear deal with Iran, it hoped to prevent North Korea developing nuclear weapons in exchange for alleviating crippling trade sanctions that had been placed upon the country, while also providing the stepping stones to an eventual normalization of relations between the US and the DPRK.
The main provisions of the Agreed Framework were:
- DPRK’s graphite-moderated 5MWe nuclear reactor, and the 50 and 200 MWe reactors under construction, would be replaced with two 1000MW light water reactor (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.
- Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK’s reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The US agreed to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year and this would be at no cost to the DPRK.
- The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.
- Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK.
Sound somewhat familiar? While not exactly the same, the framework of this agreement is fairly similar to the recent (July 2015) deal that the P5+1 agreed with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPA). In essence both agreements placed a restriction on nuclear activity in return for relief from trade sanctions. However while the DPRK accepted and adhered to their side of the agreement, the US never successfully completed any of the promises that were made, failing to construct a single LWR (construction did not begin until August of 2002 and was halted indefinitely by late-2002, even though the scheduled completion date was 2003), failing to deliver fuel as promised and failing to ease any of the trade sanctions that had been in place since the Korean War. It has been argued that the only reason the DPRK agreed to sign the treaty was because the US promised to freeze these trade sanctions, which would have been likely to return the DPRK to a nation with a prosperous economy, but due to congressional opposition the US failed to deliver. It had been noted by the president of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Stephen Bosworth, that “the Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature.”
Worryingly there are already murmurings of something similar happening, with Republicans lining up to condemn the deal even though a 2008 report by the US National Foreign Trade Council stated that:
“Iran could reduce the world price of crude petroleum by 10 percent, saving the United States annually between $38 billion (at the 2005 world oil price of $50/bbl) and $76 billion (at the proximate 2008 world oil price of $100/bbl). Opening Iran’s market place to foreign investment could also be a boon to competitive US multinational firms operating in a variety of manufacturing and service sectors.”
So why are so many high-ranking US officials so quick to dismiss any potential deal with Iran? Is it because they would rather have the oil for free? Or is it because the Israeli government says it is a bad idea? While Israel may not be part of the P5+1, let’s not try to deny the major influence it has in the world, particularly in the US (Israel already receives $3 billion a year for military spending from the US, and is now asking for $4.5 billion a year for the next 10 years in response to the JCPA. This is aside from the $1.2 billion worth of materiel the US ‘stores’ in Israel and the $500 million in US funds provided to Israeli anti-missile development every year.) and with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netenyahu calling the deal a “capitulation” and “bad mistake of historic proportions” it is clear what their position is on the JCPA.
With the lifting of US trade sanctions alone potentially providing Iran with an increase in annual trade of as much as $61billion (which would add around 32% to Iran’s GDP), there is no arguing that the US is the major player in the JCPA. If they were to pull out, it is likely that the deal would collapse, especially considering the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s stance towards America and his admission during an address in Tehran to mark the end of Ramadan that “our policies toward the arrogant government of the United States will not be changed at all”. While the ease of trade sanctions with the EU and China may provide some boon to Iran’s economy, Iran-China trade value was already estimated at around $50billion dollars in 2012. Furthermore Iran was ranked 7th in exporting crude oil to the EU in 2011, so while there may be some more money to be made with the abolishment of UN trade sanctions imposed by the rest of the P5+1, it is unlikely that the Iranian government would be too worried about the potential of creating some, comparatively minor, extra funds in lieu of saving face when receiving such an open affront from the US.
A pulling out of the deal would not only signify and unwillingness to cooperate peacefully but it is arguable that it could also be seen as tantamount to a declaration of war. The US has already shown that it would be willing to invade an oil rich country over allegations of nuclear weaponry and as the only nation to have ever used a nuclear weapon as an act of war, to pull out of a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons deal is never going to look good to the citizens of a country which already harbours a great Anti-American sentiment (especially when America is close allies with one of only four UN nations that have never signed the International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a country with a policy of opacity regarding its nuclear weapons program, a country where both the Prime Minister and the leader of Netanyahu’s main opposition have openly declared their distaste with the JCPA). While the US pulling out of the deal may not necessarily start a physical war, it may create an environment of resentment in Iran, a country that is unlikely to need any additional Anti-American sentiment (likewise, it may further the Anti-Iranian sentiment in America). It only takes one rogue individual or organisation to do something untoward and spark another ‘axis of evil’ speech and with the increasing possibility that US president will be a Republican in 2016 (that is not to say that any of the Democratic candidates are without fault), well, that is an increasing possibility. We don’t need another Afghanistan, or another ‘Axis of Evil’ speech. American Sniper was bad enough.
While all this may be speculation for now, one only has to look at the way the US dealt the DPRK during the turbulent, and short-lived, Agreed Framework of 1994 and the rising sentiment in the US that the JCPA is a “bad deal” to see that there may yet still be trouble ahead.
